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The main thesis of the Ranis paper is that the development of a
newly independent economy should occur in two phases. (Mercifully,
he has abjured the term "stages.") The first is a "growth-promotin
phase in which there is a "planned restructuring" of the econo
toward import substitution. Resource use is determined by direct gov-
ernment allocation or by administered prices that have been distorted
away from the levels that prevail in world markets or that would pro-
vide domestic market equilibrium. The second is an efficiency-promot-
ing phase in which relative prices are adjusted toward their equilibrium
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levels, undoing the "artificial distortions" of the earlier phase and
shifting the economy toward export expansion.
I find myself able to agree with exactly 50 per cent of this argument,
fortunately the half that describes the direction in which most under-
developed economies should be moving today. Development economists
have been increasingly recognizing the need to go beyond the phase
of import-substituting industrialization,' and the Ranis paper is useful
in marshaling many of the arguments and in illustrating them with
two of the most persuasive case histories.2 The most important contri-
bution of the paper may be the suggestion from the Korean case that
saving rates can actually be increased by dismantling a system of con-
trols partly established for the purpose of stimulating saving.a
I find myself unable to accept even the qualified endorsement Ranis
bestows on the distorted-price phase: that it is "worth the price," but
"only if it is geared to a gradual reduction of controls over time." My
own position is that there is far less conflict than he implies between
the objective of basic growth and the objective of efficiency, and that
what conflict exists does not justify the kinds and magnitudes of price
distortions typically adopted to encourage import substitution.
1 See, for example, Santiago Macario, "Protectionism and Industrialization in
Latin America," Economic Bulletin for Latin America, March 1964, pp. 61-101;
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (Raul Prebisch), Towards
a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America, New York, 1963, esp. pp. 6-8,
67-78; Bela Balassa, "Integration and Resource Allocation in Latin America," 1966,
mimeographed; John H. Power, "Industrialization in Pakistan: A Case of Frustrated
Take-Off," Pakistan Development Review, Summer 1963; Power, "Import Substitu-
tion as an Industrialization Strategy," Philippine Journal of Economics, Second
Semester, 1966, pp. 167-204; and Henry J. Bruton, "Productivity Growth in Latin
America," American Economic Review, December 1967, pp. 1099-1116.
2 In our common zeal for the merits of a market system we should be careful not
to exaggerate. When Ranis tries to establish for Pakistan "a time-phased relationship
between changes in agricultural price policy and in the willingness to adopt the
burgeoning new technology" of the Green Revolution, I fear he risks crossing this
line. Mexican wheat and International Rice Research Institute rice were not intro-
duced into Pakistan on a commercial scale until 1965 and 1967, respectively. Growth
f acreage was spectacular, and improvements in market conditions undoubtedly
ade the new varieties more attractive. However, the profitability of adoption
would have been high even without these improvements, and we cannot contrast
this fast adoption with some earlier period in which the technology was available
to Pakistani farmers but was not being applied. (For profitability figures, see Lester
R. Brown, Seeds of Change, New York, 1970, p. 42.)
5 It is not really clear, however, why "distortions between the price of capital and
of consumer goods may have led to high saving and low capital formation" in
Argentina but "to relatively low saving and low capital formation" in Pakistan.
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF PROBLEM AND POLICY "W
The Ranis paper offers three economic bases for a conflict between
growth and efficiency as an economy emerges from a state of de-
pendency-a lack of price-responsive entrepreneurs, a shortage of over-
head facilities, and the immobility of resources and information.' The
policy implications of these deficiencies would seem to be straight-
forward. The "infant entrepreneurial argument" is one that favors
subsidizing and supporting entrepreneurship in general-through
schools of business administration, special training programs in
entrepreneurial skill and motivations, and the widespread availability
of business credit (raised, if necessary, through taxation) at equilibrium
interest rates. A lack of market information suggests that government
should supply it directly or encourage cooperation among competing
firms to seek it out. Resource immobility and deficient infrastructure
justify government action to subsidize or supply basic overheads in
transportation, communications, and education. What is striking, how-
ever, is the contrast between such neutral policies and the pricing and
allocation policies which Ranis defends as necessary to overcome the
4 Ranis cites a fourth, noneconomic justification for the system of distorted prices:
"strong ideological reasons for not wanting to accept a market-oriented system" and
for having "the public sector play a more extensive role." I do not think the
economist must mutely bow in deference to such "reasons." The ideologies in
question rarely seek ends which are unattainable through a fairly close adherence to
equilibrium prices; rather, they often introduce dogmatic misperceptions of the
relationship between means and ends. The job of the economist is not to take such
misperceptions as given, or to rationalize them into "necessities," but to point out
how ignoring opportunity costs can cripple the attainment of any set of economic
objectives and to devise less costly ways of translating ideology into policy. For
example, if the state must play "a more extensive role," the economist can make
the case that the entrepreneurial gap is wider and the expected social return to
investment is higher in the agricultural infrastructure than in automobile assembly.
The notion that adherence to ideologically prescribed means can itself be a source
of national welfare parallels the argument that no forms of habitual consumption
can be decried as "wasteful," since the individual's preference for them is itself an
indication of their utility. Veblen's reaction seems apt: "The question is . . .
whether, under the existing circumstances of individual habit and social cust
given expenditure conduces to the particular consumer's gratification or pea
mind; but whether, aside from acquired tastes and from the canons of usage and
conventional decency, its result is a net gain in comfort or the fullness of life."
This way of posing the question is even more appropriate in examining development
policy, which can often gratify the politician or bureaucrat who calls the tune,
while detracting from the comfort of the taxpayer, worker, or consumer who must
pay the piper.
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*me obstacles. He lists many of the typical elements of "the import
substitution syndrome": the undervaluing and rationing of foreign
exchange; tariffs and import controls that are more stringent for con-
sumer goods than for capital equipment; subsidized interest rates to
favored borrowers; price controls and rationing for some basic material
inputs; and measures to turn the internal terms of trade against agri-
culture. To this list we might add several more items: governn nt in-
ducements for higher urban wages; the escalation of tariff structures
by degree of fabrication; the conferring of astronomical levels of effec-
tive protection; and a systematic tendency to underprice government
services and products.
The net effect of these distorted price and allocation policies is to
induce economic decisions which ignore the opportunity costs of re-
sources, as represented by world prices and domestic factor availabili-
ties. In an economically arbitrary manner these discriminatory
policies favor the production of import substitutes over exports, of
manufactured goods over agricultural commodities, and of consumer
goods over capital goods; 5 they stimulate so wide an array of industries
that few can attain an internationally competitive scale of production;
they encourage the use of imported inputs in the domestic assembly
of final goods; they favor capital-intensive techniques over labor-inten-
sive ones; and they create bottlenecks in the provision of overhead
services that provide neither guidance for the direction of further
expansion nor the means by which such expansion can be financed.
6
Ranis accurately describes the costs of maintaining this system as
"patently large," so it should be abandoned once it has had time to
"do its job." The system he describes, however, is never well suited to
the job he has assigned it, is never accurately aimed at "the heart of
the development problem."
5 Power ("Industrialization," pp. 192-97) argues that the bias toward the pro-
duction of consumption goods itself entails a bias toward consumption expenditure.Sm 6 Ranis at one point characterizes his early phase as one of "land- or raw
aterial-based import substitution" as against later phases of labor-based and
then skill-based "export substitution." If (as appears in the discussion of Korea) he
means to contrast the characteristic inputs to exports, this distinction seems useful.
The import-substitution process, however, is itself rarely "land or raw material"
intensive but, as he says elsewhere, typically "capital- and import-intensive," and
this defiance of the law of comparative advantage is a major source of its excessive
cost.
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Governments do not need distorted prices to induce them to sti
late entrepreneurship, to provide information, or to undertake over-
head investments. Rather, increased supplies of entrepreneurship, in-
formation, and overhead capital can make their greatest contribution
to devclopment only if they support directly productive activities that
are planned or established in close response to real opportunity costs
in the , conomy. Many overhead services to production will realize that
contribution only if they are rationed by prices which reflect their
actual scarcities.
By contrast, the system of price distortions does "its job" by creating
"larger than normal" profit opportunities in some lines but not in
others. It stimulates entrepreneurship in automobile assembly but not
in fertilizer production; it creates flows of information about the
domestic market for tires made from imported rubber but not about
the world market for glass made from domestic silicates; it provides
railway lines to mammoth steel complexes but few dirt roads to village
craftsmen and vegetable growers; it provides transportation so cheap
that the mills can locate far from their sources of coal but close to their
sources of import licenses.?
EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT GROWTH
The important contrast is not between growth and efficiency but be-
tween efficient growth and inefficient growth. Both theory and history
suggest that efficient growth in the early phase of economic independ-
ence is (1) faster, because it wastes fewer of the limited resources cur-
rently available in the economy; and (2) more sustainable, because it
saddles the future with fewer social structures that resist change and
fewer economic structures that have to be scrapped, subsidized, or
artificially supported.
As to the greater speed of efficient growth, the case histories of South
Korea and Pakistan are suggestive but not conclusive, since the period
of negligible per capita growth under distorted prices may-as 's
7 See, for example, Edward S. Mason, Economic Development in Indiad
Pakistan, Cambridge, Mass., September 1966, pp. 8-9; Anne O. Krueger, "Some
Economic Costs of Exchange Control: The Turkish Case," Journal of Political
Economy, October 1966; John A. King, Jr., "Colombia: Steel," Case 30 in Economic
Development Projects and Their Appraisal, Baltimore, 1967, pp. 505-27; and Alan
Carlin, "Indian Transportation: A Sectoral Approach to Development Constraints,"
Journal of Development Studies, July, 1967.
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implies-have laid some essential groundwork for rapid growth when
price distortions were finally reduced. Fortunately, there are many
examples of underdeveloped economies that have grown continuously
and rapidly in the postwar years in a single phase of broad participa-
tion in the world market-the Central American republics, the Ivory
Coast, Lebanon, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and, to a great
extent, Mexico and Peru., Both Dudley Seers and Barend de Vries
have provided cross-sectional evaluations of the strategy of inward-
directed growth through distorted prices, largely for the Latin Amer-
ican economies, and have shown that only the largest of these have
been able to maintain respectable aggregate growth. Thus, the South
American pattern of development-what Prebisch has come to lament
as "industrialization in watertight compartments"-has not taken
Brazil, with a broad spectrum of resources and a sizable domestic mar-
ket, nearly so far from the exploitation of comparative advantage and
economies of scale as it has taken Paraguay and Uruguay.
9 Estimates
of Chile's loss of current GNP through allocative distortions run from
2.5 per cent (Harberger) to 14 per cent (Balassa's upper limit). 0
8 The list includes none of the largest of the underdeveloped economies-not
because the policy of growth through trade at world prices has failed for them, but
because few (if any) have tried it. Reaching farther back into history, there are
many explanations of the remarkable development of Japan, but it seems difficult
to explain the pattern of that development without including the fact that for
most of the Meiji period Japan was forbidden by treaty from levying import duties
of more than 5 per cent ad valorem. (See, for example, W. W. Lockwood, The
Economic Development of Japan, Princeton, 1954, p. 539.) Individual enterprises
were established and temporarily subsidized by the government, but the main
thrust of "structural change" took place in the context of world prices.
9 Barend A. de Vries, "Importance of Size for the Orientation of Economic Policy,"
in David Krivine, ed., Fiscal and Monetary Problems in Developing States, New
York, 1967, pp. 309-23; and Dudley Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development
of a Primary Producer in the Middle of the Twentieth Century," Economic Bulletin
of Ghana, 1963, pp. 57-69. This kind of reasoning and evidence tends to support
Ranis's assertion that "the relative importance of the exchange rate is much greater
in the case of a small economy than in that of a large one." Such assertions, how-
ever, should not overlook the effect of the distorted price policy in reducing the.import share of GNP but making it more strategic for the continued functioning
of the economy. The smaller tail is often more able to wag the dog. Witness, for
example, stories of Pakistani coal mines being forced to close temporarily for lack
of imported safety lamps, or 40 per cent of Indian tractors being out of commission
in 1966 for lack of imported spare parts. On the latter, see Brown, Seeds, p. 60.
10 Balassa, "Integration," pp. 3-8. Arnold C. Harberger, "Using the Resources at
Hand More Effectively," American Economic Review, May 1958, pp. 134-55. Assume
these resources to have been saved rather than wasted. From an historical (but
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Inefficient growth is less sustainable than efficient growth becau
it achieves not only "a broadening of the resources base, both human
and material," but also embeds that base in structures that continue
to delay and inhibit the transition to a more efficient pattern of pro-
duction. On the human side, entrepreneurs trained at "chasing slips
of paper and subverting the control system" may bear no special quali-
fication for chasing customers in world markets or subverting the
mindless application of Western technology to domestic production."
"Entrenched" industrial and bureaucratic interests may use all their
accumulated power to sabotage any tendency toward market rationing
at equilibrium prices.
There is little evidence that the distorted price system serves to
transform institutions "in directions which accommodate rather than
obstruct change." All too often the corollary of "structural change"
through distorted prices is structural resistance to restoring an efficient
pattern of production. Significantly, the dramatic decontrol measures
in South Korea and Pakistan were both decreed by strong governments
that were born in military coups and had secure power bases independ-
ent of the bureaucratic and industrial interests."
On the material side, the most pernicious legacy of an inefficient
pattern of investment is not the abandoned cannery or the broad
highway reverting to jungle, widespread though such examples may be.
Such investments can be written off to experience while the economy
inefficient) Chilean capital-output ratio of 3.2, we can crudely calculate that the
growth rate could have been higher by 0.8 to 4.4 per cent. Bruton, "Productivity,"
estimates "residuals" (annual growth rates of productivity) during the postwar period
which are respectable for Mexico (above 2 per cent), low for Brazil and Colombia
(about 11 per cent), negligible for Chile, and negative for Argentina.
11 Presumably the spectacular business success of Captain Gohar Ayub in Pakistan
over the period 1963-68-in automotive assembly, canning, and the distribution of
imported tractors-was not entirely due to the applicability of his military training
to entrepreneurship but bore some relationship to the fact that he was the son of
the president of the republic.
12 It might be unfair to apply to a normative "phase" theory one of Si
Kuznets's requirements for a descriptive "stage" theory-that it identify "the m
processes in the preceding stage that complete it and, with the usual qualificatio
for exogenous factors, make the next . . . stage highly probable" ("Notes on the
Take-Off," in W. W. Rostow, ed., The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained
Growth, New York, 1963, p. 24). If, however, as Ranis implies, movement out of the
distorted-price phase is a requirement for its validity, then L.ny useful normative
theory must establish that the impetus for the transition is something more en-
dogenous to the economy than the deus ex mnachina of a takeover by strong-willed
and well-advised military leaders.
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goes forward into more promising lines of production. Nor is it the
government enterprise which, after a decade of operations, enjoys a
profit rate only half that of comparable private firms. Rather, the
heaviest burden on the future is created when inefficient enterprises
must have their operating costs subsidized directly by the government
(like the ubiquitous national airlines) or indirectly by the economy
(like the Pakistani industries which, well into the "efficient" phase of
economic development, were consuming raw materials worth more on
world markets than the final goods they were producing).'3 An addi-
tional burden on the future results when new inefficient enterprises
are created primarily to justify an original inefficient enterprise by
providing its inputs (e.g., the parts for domestically assembled auto-
mobiles) or by purchasing its outputs (e.g., electricity or steel for which
there is inadequate domestic demand).'4 While the cases of direct sub-
sidization are more blatant and entail the extra cost of dissipating
scarce government revenues, the many forms of indirect subsidization
may ultimately do more to hamstring the growth potential of the
economy.
CONCLUSION
I do not think we need to be so relative in our advocacy of economic
efficiency as Ranis implies. I think it is perfectly possible to devise a
13 While the extent of "negative value added" in Pakistan reported by Soligo and
Stern, based on highly indirect evidence, was probably exaggerated, more detailed
investigations still find examples of the phenomenon. Examples are not confined
to import-substituting industries but spread to the export sector-e.g., cotton
textiles in Pakistan, cocoa butter in Ghana-when export preferences are granted
to manufacturing but not to agriculture. (See, for example, Richard Mallon, "Export
Policy in Pakistan," Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1966, pp. 58-79; and
Elliot J. Berg, "Structural Transformation vs. Gradualism: Recent Economic
Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast," 1969, azographed.) Of more quanti-
tative importance may be the heavy outlays in domestic resources to save insignificant
-but positive-amounts of foreign exchange.
14 Specific examples of "linkages" used to subsidize inefficiency include the pro-
gressive "content-protection" regulations applied to automobile assembly in Latin
America; action of the colonial government of Uganda to subsidize an abortive
industrial estate near the site of the Owen Falls Dam; and tax exemptions granted
by the Colombian government to users of steel from the Paz del Rio mill. See, for
example, Leland L. Johnson, "Problems of Import Substitution: The Chilean
Automobile Industry," Economic Development and Cultural Change, January 1967,
pp. 202-16; Walter Elkan and Gail G. Willson, "The Impact of the Owen Falls
Hydro-Electric Project on the Economy of Uganda," Journal of Development
Studies, July 1967, pp. 387-404; and Richard C. Porter, "The Effectiveness of Tax
Exemption in Colombia," 1969, multilithed.
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general defense of the equilibrium exchange rate as the basic device
for rationing foreign exchange and an equilibrium interest rate as the
basic device for rationing capital and for price rationing in general
as opposed to quantitative restrictions. I think it is possible to phrase
that defense in ways that are independent "of the type of economy we
are talking about" and the "phase of development" in which that
economy finds itself, one which would be as relevant for Burma as for
the United States. Equilibrium prices do not imply laissez faire, and
such a defense need not preclude a substantial developmental role for
government-in the areas of saving, investing in infrastructure, stimu-
lating entrepreneurship, exercising monopolistic power in particular
world markets, nurturing truly infant industries, regulating aggregate
demand, and insuring some appropriate tradeoff between equity and
the speed and efficiency of the growth process.1 5 Nor need that defense
deny that an efficient pattern of growth will entail substantial and
continuing import substitution, particularly for a large economy. It
should even recognize that administrative obstacles or distributional
considerations may force a solution in which some individual prices
are taxed or subsidized to draw them away from world or domestic
equilibrium levels. But a general statement of development policy
would hold that efficiency is always "relevant" and that no rational
pattern of divergences from equilibrium prices would in any way
resemble the systematic distortions and gross inefficiences typically
introduced in the name of "structural change" through import sub-
stitution during the "growth-promoting phase" of economic develop-
ment.
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WOLFGANG F. STOLPER, University of Michigan
There are a number of disagreements with Gustav Ranis's presenta-
tion of the problem but, to vary the French phrase, l'accord vient en
lisant. In fact the paper seems to be written by two people. There is
Ranis the statesman and apologist, the understanding father confessor.
And then there is Ranis the economist, who really knows better, who
knows that in fact tout cornprendre n'est pas tout pardonner, and who
realizes that the cost of nonsense is just too high. In a discussion, it is
proper to stress the disagreements even though in fact the agreements
dominate. The disagreements diminish with each section.
First, I regret that Ranis has in a sense prejudiced his discussion by
equating a market-oriented with a capitalist economy, and by seeming
to suggest that only in these do prices have a proper role. Even if we
had a centrally planned economy, prices would of course be an essen-
tial planning tool-vide "Liebermanism"-though they would (ideally)
reflect the planners' rather than consumers' preferences. Even there
they would (ideally) reflect true scarcities of factors, which of course are
affected by the planners' preferences for particular output mixes.
Prices are not an ideological phenomenon-though many countries
believe they are, and act as if they could ignore them. No priceless
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economy of any complexity exists. What happens depends on wh
prices happen to be, and if they are irrational, irrational things hap-
pen. Why should the absence of a "large number of entrepreneurs
sensitive to price and profit signals" make any difference? (Ranis). For
one class of entrepreneurs, farmers, it is by now reasonably well estab-
lished that they do react to price signals. But suppose there are no
entrepreneurs, and the whole manufacturing and agricultural sector is
controlled by the government. How would a planner decide upon a
steel or textile mill or anything else without reference to cost and
prices? And if he wants to increase the amount of goods available to
the economy-whether for private consumption or public investment
or education or social overhead-he still would want to avoid waste.
How could that be done without prices?
Let us also agree that the conditions of Pareto-optimality in the
static sense-are not entirely relevant, and in the dynamic sense not
easily achieved. But let us then declare a moratorium on the necessity
of such stringent conditions, let us forget the very artificial and indeed
pernicious distinction between prices as an allocation and prices as a
growth-promoting device, and let us settle for practical purposes on the
necessity to use prices and to have prices reasonably (not perfectly)
realistic (as defined above).
Ranis states:
the relevance of the price system as an essential instrument to ensure opti-
mality requires that there exist no economic necessity, e.g., because of scale or
other reasons, for government to play a substantial role in the economy's
directly productive areas, and moreover, that there exist no overriding non-
economic or ideological "necessity" to have the public sector play a more
extensive role. Thirdly, we must assume the relatively full and free flow of
information and resources, i.e., the absence of pronounced institutional
constraints.
I find this almost totally unacceptable even where it is correct.
I. The supposed economic necessity for government to play a role
refers, among others, presumably to economics of the public util'
type, where "natural monopolies" make marginal cost pricing inappli-
cable. Now from a planning standpoint which deals with future invest-
ments, variable and fixed and hence marginal and total cost are the
same anyway. But surely, the failure of marginal cost pricing (as
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applied to a particular existing project) to give correct answers hardly
justifies dismissing the use of prices as a planning tool. There are still
more or less rational ways to do business.
2. Ditto for having a larger or smaller public sector. The real point
is that "ideology" has been used to "subsidize,"-i.e., to justify-an
uneconomic allocation, or to put it differently either (a) to justify the
eating up of one's capital; and/or (b) to tax the productive sectors
(usually agriculture) more and more in favor of supposed "dynamic"
sectors or "socially desirable" ends. The fact, however, is, as J. R. Hicks
remarked a long time ago, that the satisfaction of social needs quickly
runs into the barrier of insufficient productivity. Or, as I have desper-
ately tried to put it to a minister of finance: I understand that politics
has priority over economics. I do not understand how you propose to
meet political ends without economic means. Prices are nonideological,
and the preference of ideology over economics is a confusion of ends
and means.
Since these lines were written-and I have stressed this point for
many years-Le Monde has carried a report of Le Duan's prescription
for North Vietnamese planning. Le Duan stresses the importance of
productivity and the weaknesses in project management (gestion). He
stresses that there must be planning, of course, but "dans quelle
mesure utiliser les rapports de marchi, et les leviers du credit, des prix,
des salaires, du profit?" 1 I could go on quoting the first secretary of
the North Vietnamese Communist party as a crown witness for my
point of view. It suffices to stress that it is completely wrong to say, as
Ranis does, that "the society must be practically and ideologically
1 Jacques Decornoy, "M. Le Duan met l'accent sur 'la revolution technique' et la
ndcessitd de rationaliser l'economie," Le Monde (Paris), June 21-22, 1970, p. 5. De-
cornoy summarizes with numerous quotations a 200-page North Vietnamese docu-
ment. It is somewhat embarrassing for a capitalist American to quote the Chief
Enemy. But I can think of nothing better to show that economic development is
"really" a matter of economics and that prices belong to the faits recalcitrants et
titus of the economy than to do so. Since I have several times referred to the
recalcitrant nature of economic reality and since this is a highly idiosyncratic use of
the word, I wonder whether part of my royalties have come from Hanoi!
Le Duan's willingness to analyze his situation so objectively and to blame the
neglect of economics rather than the Central Intelligence Agency or even the
bombing for his troubles explains perhaps why North Vietnam has been able to
cause us so much trouble! It would certainly be better for the United States if he
preferred ideology to economical
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ready to accept the capitalist system as a driving force." I am aware tha
political scientists sometimes argue this way. But the problem is one of
efficiency and not ideology; it is not whether an enterprise should be
public or private, but whether it produces a net output or wastes
resources.
3. Finally, the lack of information is desperately real. But the con-
clusion I draw is that planners must still use prices the best way they
can. The presence of "institutional constraints" explains why things
go wrong, not that one can do without prices.
Ranis has put his finger on an important shortcoming of planning
models in general: the absence of government in influencing allocation.
But this means not that prices are less important, but only that the
models are irrelevant precisely in situations in which the government
is given a crucial role in determining how resources are to be used
against how many are to be used.
I do not therefore see just what Ranis is .driving at in his implied
assertion that an efficient utilization of available resources is not in fact
"the" (his quotes) major social problem, particularly in the face of a
"frequently stagnant colonial agrarian situation," and that such role as
relative prices has does not capture the "essence" of the development
problem; which is "basically . . . the achievement of structural change
via a broadening of the resources base, both human and material. The
basic question . . . is not how to allocate given resources more effi-
ciently, but how to introduce technological change . . . ," etc. Pre-
cisely. Having defined the object of development to make sure that as
the result of one's resource allocation I come out with more resources
to allocate rather than less, and with more and better choices (in my
Planning Without Facts) and being a student of Schumpeter, I have
never understood the problem of resource allocation in a dynamic
context to be anything else. The dichotomy made by Ranis does not
exist (except possibly on the rarified level of purest mathematical static
theory), any more than the idea that prices have something to do
exclusively with a market economy. Ranis's section I, in other words,
a red herring.
It is a very dangerous red herring indeed. Perhaps Ranis has been
seduced by the theory of stages. He discusses in his section II the import
substitution phase through which newly independent countries are
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"likely" to pass. But again Ranis seems to me to contradict himself.
Prices cannot be expected to create the environment for growth; there-
fore planners may have to use protection and subsidies to make pro-
duction profitable. But this simply means that the price system is
rigged in favor of certain activities. It is a kind of primitive shadow-
pricing policy.
Countries try to get rid of colonial production patterns-and more
power to them. But the colonial patterns were often (not always) main-
tained precisely by rigged prices-the French system of paying higher
than world market prices is perhaps- the best example-and rigged
markets-again the French have offered protected markets to their
colonies. It should be self-evident that underdeveloped countries
having scarce resources must rationally allocate them to achieve their
ends. Ranis's account shows that in fact the opposite has happened.
How did it happen? Ranis refers to Prebisch, and far be it from me
to defend him. But those of us who had thought to bypass the pricing
mechanism in favor of continuous subsidies or of decision making in
physical terms bear a considerable guilt. We complain about tech-
niques deemed too capital-intensive, yet rig low interest rates; we com-
plain about misusing scarce foreign exchange, yet rig overvalued
exchange rates; we complain about the absence of entrepreneurs, and
let a bureaucrat produce steel with no economic sanctions and virtu-
ally unlimited access to the budget. We create institutions to break
bottlenecks, and then make it impossible for them to achieve their end
because we set up an irrational price system. To add insult to injury,
this sort of nonsense is sometimes defended by reference to "learning
by doing." Yet those of our colleagues who developed this idea never
had in mind the abuse, any more than Arthur Lewis's Industrialization
of the Gold Coast can possibly be used to defend what passes as an
import substitution policy.
In short it is precisely the attempt to bypass prices as a planning
device-or to console oneself perhaps that they are the dual of an
input-output table-which has led to the absurd situation so well de-
scribed by Ranis. There has been no "learning by doing" because the
curriculum has been irrelevant in the absence of decent prices. Nor has
there in all likelihood been any import saving.
Thus Ranis is obviously right that if the "hothouse" atmosphere of
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controls and wrong prices (leading to windfall profits instead of out-
put), etc., is not abandoned, entrepreneurs cannot learn their business.
But it remains quite unclear just how the creation of the hothouse
atmosphere did any good in the first place. There is a Rasputin-like
quality about the argument: the more you sin, the greater the salva-
tion. But it really makes no more sense in economics than in theology,
and it can ruin economies as well as empires, ministers of finance and
planning as well as czars.
Ranis describes well what happens: ". . . under the previous regime,
public and [very rarely-w.F.s.] large-scale private enterprises were the
beneficiaries in response to the actual or assumed shortage of domestic
entrepreneurship. . . ." Precisely. In the abstract, the "import substi-
tution phase" is seen as a necessary period of economic violence, as it
were, to break with the past and establish a base for the future which
the next step (so well documented by Ranis as a substitution of price
signals for direct controls) is to rationalize.
But in actuality what has happened and what Ranis has described
is really nothing of the sort. If the colonial policies, as in British West
Africa, have induced the development of a cocoa industry by small-
and medium-sized farmers, it was to the benefit of the future country-
and the absence of unjustifiable subsidies, of rigged prices, monopolies,
milking of budgets and the rest, indeed laid a sound foundation for
later stages. Where colonial policies were policies of rigged prices and
guaranteed markets, of subsidies and exploitation, it did nothing of
the kind. The policies of import substitution as practiced-not as
envisaged by W. A. Lewis or Hirschmann-in fact continued the
colonial pattern of exploitation, of freezing the economy in inefficient
patterns, of preventing the emergence of entrepreneurs, whether
private or public. What difference that the color and nationality of the
exploiter changed? What difference the socialist rhetoric to which
models of indifferent academic interest give some respectability?
Nkrumah went through over $1.75 billion. It is impossible not to d
some good while spending this kind of money. Yet the prese
Ghanaian government is after ten years of Nkrumah's "socialism" with-
out foreign reserves, with a foreign debt of $1 billion, without working
capital, with a dubious endowment of fixed real capital, and has to
undo the damage of years, only to meet with snide sniper attacks.
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Sukharno did the seemingly impossible: He did eat up practically all
of his patrimony without noticeable benefits. In Latin America, the
industrialization policies have aggravated revolutionary situations.
The periods of import substitution had in fact not done what they
were, theoretically, supposed to do, and they could not.
So my conclusion is that the very establishment of a base for growth,
of an incipient entrepreneurial group-whether private or govern-
mental is irrelevant-requires sound price policies. (Needless to say it
requires a lot more than that, but this conference deals with price
problems). So I agree with Ranis that the problem is to promote
"growth by undoing the artificial distortions while preserving the gains
of the earlier period," while insisting that if there were any gains at all
in the "import substitution phase" they were accidental and not in-
herent in past policies.
Perhaps it would be good to add more specific uses of prices in plan-
ning. In project evaluation, the "correct" prices are evidently impor-
tant. No great sophistication is needed. The truth is that investments
will produce growth only if they are "really" profitable and if they do
not swallow up resources as hidden or open subsidies. Hence it becomes
important to estimate output prices and cost, but also timing prob-
lems, tax revenues and resources required, cash flows, etc. This links
the projects also to budgets and hence to savings which, in most coun-
tries, are prominently made a task of the government. If the prices are
reasonably correct, we can evaluate the project. If they are rigged by
tariffs or subsidies, the project can be made to look good, but by work-
ing out the budgetary implications there is a check on whether the
evaluation was reasonable. It is possible to make any individual
project look good. It is not possible to make all of them look good
at the same time.
Practically speaking it means that one should try to overestimate
cost and underestimate revenues, and that one should be careful about
when to accede to direct or indirect subsidies which hurt the budget
and are therefore at the expense of alternate investments and/or other
uses. It is precisely this neglect that leads in Ranis's import substitution
phase to such waste.
Prices are not only signals. There must be a discipline. If prices are
improper, say for "social" reasons, it will show in the budget. Example:
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In Tunisia the railway proposes an economic tariff. The government
may, for perfectly good reasons, prefer a different tariff and agree to
compensate the railway. It is a legitimate use of governmental power.
But the economist must point out that if the subsidy had been elimi-
nated, savings would have been bigger (though perhaps by less than the
subsidy reduction).
Or, if a steel mill gets the right price it will operate efficiently. If
its prices are kept high, there will be a cost to other enterprises and/or
the government. If it is too low, there will be subsidies, or else there
will be borrowing for the wrong purposes. Instead of using resources
to augment resources, instead of finding new resources, the wrong
prices invariably reduce present and future resources. This is true no
matter what the stage of development of the economy.
Prices may change over time. Hence if there is a lag between inputs
and outputs, input prices must be current-I leave aside the problem
of replacement cost-and output prices must be the best guess of the
future. Again the stage of development is irrelevant. Some of the
Ghanaian factories can be salvaged. As for the others, if the earth swal-
lowed them, it would be the best thing that could happen. The annual
operating subsidies in some cases I know of would pay for whole new
factories, with a greater output and more employment!
I do not feel it necessary to discuss Ranis's last section. There is
complete agreement as well as the awareness, shared by Ranis I am
sure, that much more than prices are involved in the Korean or
Pakistani performance, or that, for that matter, the last word on these
experiences has not yet been spoken. I conclude that the distinction
made by Ranis between growth-promoting and efficiency-promoting
functions of prices is a red herring from the standpoint of develop-
ment policy (whatever may be said for it from a purely theoretical
standpoint). No one in his right mind has ever claimed that correct
prices will automatically lead to development. Such a unicausal
proposition is undoubtedly much better than explaining growth by th
method of swaddling babies, but still insufficient. But there is no doubt
in my mind that the ignorance of how prices work and the attempt to
bypass them have in fact caused the very difficulties which are referred
to as neocolonialism and which are much more the fault of domestic
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leaders of the Nkrumah-Sukharno type and their intellectual tutors
than of such foreign scapegoats as are fashionable at the moment.
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